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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3700 
___________ 
 
DERRICK LAKEITH BROWN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No. 3-14-cv-01413) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 15, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 11, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Derrick Brown, a federal inmate, appeals an order of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing without prejudice his petition 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm. 
 In July 2014, Brown filed a § 2241 petition alleging that he has been subject to 
prolonged confinement in the Special Management Unit (SMU) at USP-Lewisburg.1  In 
particular, he claimed that his placement in the SMU deprived him of the opportunity to 
obtain all possible good time credits and seek a lower custody classification.  He also 
alleged that he should have been transferred to another facility rather than have his time 
in the SMU extended.  Finally, he asserted that the prolonged SMU confinement 
aggravated his mental illness.  As relief, Brown sought damages, transfer to another 
prison, medical and mental health evaluations, issuance of subpoenas, an evidentiary 
hearing, and an investigation of his claims. 
 The District Court held that Brown’s claims were not cognizable within a habeas 
corpus proceeding because he challenged only the conditions of his confinement.  
According to the District Court, “there is no discernible contention by Brown that his 
SMU placement resulted in any actual loss of good time credits or otherwise extended the 
length of his confinement.”  Therefore, the District Court dismissed Brown’s petition 
without prejudice to his right to reassert his claims in a properly filed civil rights 
complaint.  Brown appealed.   
                                                                                                                                                  
 
1 According to the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Locator, Brown is currently incarcerated at 
at the U.S. Penitentiary ADMAX, in Florence, Colorado. 
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 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our 
review of the District Court’s dismissal of Brown’s § 2241 petition is plenary.  See 
Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).    
 We agree with the District Court that Brown’s claims were not properly brought 
under § 2241.  Section 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal 
prisoner who is challenging . . .  the execution of his sentence.”  Woodall v. Fed. Bureau 
of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).  While we have noted that “the precise 
meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy,” we have made clear that a challenge 
under § 2241 must be to the manner in which the sentence is being “put into effect” or 
“carr[ied] out.”  Id. at 242-43; see also Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 
2012) (explaining that, in order for a prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence 
under § 2241, he must allege that the “BOP’s conduct was somehow inconsistent with a 
command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment”).  Brown’s allegations of 
prolonged placement in the SMU and the resulting consequences, including the possible 
loss of good time credits, concern the conditions of his confinement, not the manner in 
which his sentence is being carried out.  See id.; Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in 
plaintiff’s favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an action under 
§ 1983 [and not habeas corpus] is appropriate.”).  Therefore, the District Court properly 
determined that Brown’s claims are not cognizable under § 2241, and properly dismissed 
the petition. 
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 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.  
 
